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Abstract
In many workplaces co-workers have the best information about
each others e¤ort. Managers may attempt to exploit this informa-
tion through peer evaluation. I study peer evaluation in a pure moral
hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents
receive a signal about their colleagues e¤ort level, and are asked to
report it to the principal. The principal may give an individual bonus
for the receipt of a positive evaluation by a colleague, which stimu-
lates e¤ort as long as signals are revealed truthfully. A cost of lying
ascertains that there can be truthful revelation. I show that interper-
sonal relations between colleagues constrain the bonus for receiving
a positive evaluation in order to keep evaluations truthful. Still, the
principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and
possibly complement it with a team bonus. Co-worker relations have
non-monotic e¤ects on prots in the optimal contract.
JEL-codes: D86, J33, M50.
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1 Introduction
In many employment relations managers lack information about employees
individual e¤ort or performance; e.g. in highly interdependent work teams,
with work on location, or in case of specialists. In an attempt to obtain a
more complete picture of employee performance, many rms have turned
to multisource feedback, in business better known as 360 evaluations. A
360 evaluation can include performance assesments by subordinates, peers,
supervisors, customers, or other stakeholders. According to survey data,
about 90% of Fortune 1000 rms use some form of multisource feedback,
often including evaluation by peers (Edwards and Ewen 1996). In a di¤erent
survey, among member rms of the American Management Association, a
fth of the 750 responding companies reports that they use peer evaluation.
In 90% of these companies peer evaluation partially determines personnel
decisions regarding promotions and performance pay (Bohl 1996). A similar
percentage of peer evaluation usage is found in another sample of 280 US-
based rms (Antonioni 1996).
Evaluation by peers has intuitive appeal when employees have valuable
information about one anothers performance. According to the General So-
cial Survey this prerequisite is often met: Around 70% of the respondents
reports to observe the behavior of colleagues with a score of 8 out of 10 or
higher (Freeman et al. 2008). However, when seen from an economic theory
perspective, the widespread use of peer evaluation is less obvious. A major
concern is that employees may benet from providing the employer with in-
valid performance evaluations of their colleagues. For instance, employees
can provide invalid ratings so as to help their friends, hurt their competi-
tors, or game the systemthrough collusion (Edwards and Ewen 1996 and
Kozlowski et al. 1998). This paper develops a formal agency model so as to
study when and how peer evaluation should be used under di¤erent intensi-
ties of co-worker relations.
I study peer evaluation in a model of team production by two homoge-
neous agents, who are protected by limited liability. The production su¤ers
from a pure moral hazard problem, i.e., the principal is unable to distin-
guish individual inputs, and can only o¤er a team bonus for output. A team
bonus results in ine¢ ciently low e¤ort levels, since limited liability makes
the budget breaking solution infeasible. Agents receive a signal about their
colleagues e¤ort provision. The principal may attempt to improve upon the
team bonus by making use of the agents information through peer evalu-
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ation. Agents are asked to report the signal about their colleagues e¤ort,
where this evaluation determines whether the colleague receives a bonus.
As a starting point I assume ideal circumstances for these peer evaluations:
Agents have an aversion towards lying about their signal, leading them to
make truthful evaluations. The bonus for the receipt of a positive peer eval-
uation motivates agents to exert e¤ort so as to increase the likelihood that
their co-worker receives a positive signal and rates performance accordingly.
Under these ideal circumstances, peer evaluation outperforms a team bonus;
in fact, peer evaluation performs as well as individual incentives would.
Next, I allow for interpersonal relations between colleagues, either good or
bad. Social preferences can give agents an incentive to lie about their signal.
If the utility from a bonus to a friend outweighs the cost of lying, agents
with good co-worker relations give positive evaluations regardless of their
signal. Likewise, agents in bad relationships may begrudge a bonus to their
colleague and lie upon receiving a positive signal. Invalid peer evaluations
also provide incentives for e¤ort, through internalization of a colleagues lying
costs. Prots, however, are usually higher when peer evaluations remain
truthful. The principal can ensure truthful evaluation by adjusting the bonus
in peer evaluation downward, such that co-worker relations do not a¤ect the
evaluation decision. Social preferences, thereby, constrain the e¤ectiveness
of peer evaluation. Nevertheless, the optimal contract always includes peer
evaluation. The principal will complement incentives for e¤ort by including
a team bonus in case peer evaluation becomes severely constrained. The
e¤ectiveness of the team bonus increases with better co-worker relations,
as co-worker relations moderate incentives to free-ride on a colleague. Peer
evaluation su¤ers from more pronounced co-worker relations, through the
earlier discussed likeability bias. Taken together, co-worker relations have
non-monotonic e¤ects on prots.
Despite the widespread use of peer evaluation, there are few empirical
studies on its e¤ectiveness. The success of peer evaluation programs is dif-
cult to determine, since objective performance measures are often lacking,
motivating peer assesment to start with. Peiperl (1999) is one of the few em-
pirical studies that looks into success factors of peer evaluation in business.
Within a multinational service-sector organization managers were asked to
identify units with (un)successful peer evaluation. Successful peer evalua-
tion was positively correlated with a high interdependency of work within
and across units, group components in incentives, the perceived quality of
the ratings, and its integration with rewards. In addition, peer evaluation was
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found to be less successful in units that had a very positive group culture, of
which Peiperl says: "an unexpected result that bears some consideration(p.
445). The likeability bias I study in this paper can explain this observation.
The results of this paper, that better co-worker relations erode peer eval-
uation, while they strengten the e¤ectiveness of a team bonus, are largely in
line with ndings by Towry (2003). In a laboratory experiment, she stud-
ies how the e¤ectiveness of these two incentive schemes are inuenced by a
team identity manipulation. In this experiment, participants either receive
a compensation based on a colleagues report about performance, i.e. peer
evaluation, or they receive team bonus with punishment opportunities in
a second stage. Towry nds that the peer evaluations are undermined by
strong team identity, because team members became more likely to cover for
each others shirking behavior. The team incentive, on the other hand, was
more e¤ective in this strong team identity treatment, as these teams achieved
higher levels of cooperation, without a di¤erence in punishment behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview
of the related literature. Section 3 describes the set-up of the model, followed
by the analysis in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
In a pioneering paper, Ma (1988) shows that there exist mechanisms where
it is in the agentsbest interest to report shared information truthfully. Ma
considers a principal who is unable to observe the inputs of a team of agents,
while agents observe each othersactions perfectly. The principal can imple-
ment rst-best e¤ort by asking one agent to report the e¤ort choices of all
team members, and giving other agents the option to challenge this report.
There exists a lottery for which the option to challenge a report is exercised
if and only if the report contains a lie. Since other agents will always chal-
lenge a false report, it is optimal for the reporting agent to state the chosen
actions truthfully. The principal, thereby, retrieves the agentsinformation
on individual inputs, which enables him to implement rst-best e¤ort.
This paper di¤ers from the set-up by Ma in the agentsability to observe
each othersaction: Instead of perfect observability, or an assumption that
signals are su¢ cient statistics for e¤ort (Fischer and Hughes 1997), I assume
that agents get a coarse signal of a colleagues performance. In the set-up
I consider, the principal does not benet from asking agents to report their
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own e¤ort choice in addition to the signal about a co-workers e¤ort. The
coarse signals do not allow colleagues to verify the stated reports perfectly,
hence the principal cannot play o¤ agentsreports against each other. As a
consequence, agents have no incentive to report their e¤ort truthfully, ren-
dering the mechanism above infeasible. In many work settings, e.g. within
health care, consultancy, or academics, the performance assesment by peers
is relevant, yet it is rarely based on perfect information about e¤ort.
Instead of interpersonal relations, Barron and Gupte (2009) focus on other
limitations of peer evaluation. The authors introduce harmful consequences
of negative peer appraisals, modelled in two ways: First, negative appraisals
make agents less productive through a drop in team cohesion. Second, agents
experience a loss of utility due to peer pressure. Barron and Gupte show that,
in a Ma-type of lottery for truthtelling, agents need a higher compensation
to report shirking by a colleague.1 Peer evaluation is no longer guaranteed
to be protable under these adverse e¤ects of a negative appraisal, instead
protability depends on the quality of signals among peers.
Marx and Squintani (2009) also analyse a pure moral hazard problem
in team production, where agents can be given the task to evaluate each
other. Without peer evaluation, the combination of unobservable individual
e¤ort choices, and an inability to punish individuals without proof of shirking
behavior, results in low output. The principal can achieve the rst-best
outcome with a contract that demands both high e¤ort and peer monitoring,
notwithstanding that monitoring is costly. The peer monitoring gives an
incentive to provide e¤ort, as the principal can now punish upon observing
low output. Punishment is possible, since peer monitoring provides veriable
evidence of shirking, or in case evidence is lacking, agents failed to monitor.
The principal will not punish agents for not monitoring with high output,
because he cannot distinguish between non-monitoring and the absence of
evidence for shirking. Therefore, the agents exert e¤ort and refrain from
monitoring in equilibrium, leading to the rst-best. The authors show that
their results are sensitive to the monitoring technology.
1The lottery o¤ered in Barron and Gupte (2009) plays o¤ the signal that a co-worker
receives against a signal the principal has, while Ma (1988) only uses the information that
the agents share.
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3 The model
I consider a principal who employs two homogeneous agents, denoted by i
and j, and maximizes the following prot function:
 = '(ei; ej)QH  
X
i
[wLi + '(ei; ej)w +mjiBi] ; where i 6= j: (1)
The principals prot equals output minus wages. Output can be high or
low, where high output has value QH and low output is set to zero. The
probability of high output depends on the e¤ort of both agents, '(ei; ej) =
ei + ej.2 The principal only observes the output level that is realized, i.e.,
e¤ort choices are unobservable. Wages can contain a base wage, wLi, a team
bonus for high output, w, and a bonus for the receipt of a positive peer
evaluation, Bi. Wages are subject to a limited-liability constraint: The wage
cannot be negative in any state of the world. This gives the following limited-
liability constraints:
wLi  0; wLi +Bi  0; wLi +w  0; wLi +Bi +w  0: (2)
Agents maximize the following utility function:
Ui = wLi + '(ei; ej)w +mjiBi   C(ei)   jmij   sijj+ Uj: (3)
Utility is increasing in the wage and decreasing with costs of e¤ort. For
convenience, I assume quadratic costs of e¤ort: C(ei) = 12e
2
i . The principal
asks agents to evaluate the performance of their colleague: Agent i sends an
evaluation message to the principal about agent js performance, denoted by
mij. Agents can base their evaluation on a signal they receive about their
colleagues e¤ort level. The signal, sij 2 f0; 1g, takes on zero when agent
i perceives js e¤ort is below some standard and one if j performed well
according to i. The probability of a high signal depends on the colleagues
e¤ort, Pr(sij = 1) = p(ej) = ej. I assume that there are some costs of
deviating from ones signal, or  > 0. These costs can stem from the time
and energy spent to misrepresent information (Kartik 2009) and many people
2The assumption of a probabilistic team output is not essential, it is important that
individual inputs are unobservable to the principal. It does simplify the analysis by the
reduction of the number of possible team bonuses. Further, it creates the need for a
restriction on QH , or on the cost of e¤ort, such that high output with certainty is not
pre¤ered over the optimal contract.
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bear a psychological costs of lying (Gneezy 2005, Hurkens and Kartik 2009,
Fischbacher and Heusi 2008). The last term in the utility function captures
social preferences in the workplace. A positive  captures altruism, whereas a
negative  represents feelings of spite. As a consequence of the homogeneity
assumption,  can also be interpreted as the quality of a relationship between
colleagues. Substitution of Uj into (3) gives:
Ui =
1
1  2

wLi + '(ei; ej)w +mjiBi   C(ei)   jmij   sijj
+ [wLj + '(ei; ej)w +mijBj   C(ej)   jmji   sjij]

;
where  is restricted to  1 <  < 1, to ensure an interior solution.3
The timing of the game is as follows: First, there is a contracting stage,
where the agents can accept or reject the o¤ered contract. Next, each agent
chooses e¤ort. Finally, the agents receive a signal about their co-workers
e¤ort level and send an evaluation message to the principal, after which
output is realized and the contracts are executed.
4 Analysis
In a situation without peer evaluation, the principal can only use the team
bonus to stimulate e¤ort provision. The team bonus su¤ers from a well-
known internalization problem; as the agentscosts of e¤ort are private, while
the benets are not fully internalized, the free-rider problem arises. Still,
the principal can achieve rst-best prots with a team bonus when budget
breaking is possible (Holmstrom, 1982). The principal pays the full marginal
product to both agents, and achieves rst-best prots through a negative
base wage. Budget breaking is not feasible here, as agents are assumed to
be limitedly liable. Hence, a team bonus cannot implement rst-best e¤ort.
Next, let us see whether it is possible to improve upon the team bonus by
peer evaluations.
The game is solved backwards, starting with the peer evaluation stage.
As a consequence of the binary signal, the principal believes at best two
3The term 11 2 is like a social multiplier of utility. In case of positive relations, agent
i not only enjoys the utility of j, but also that j values is well-being. In case of bad
relations, js utility enters as a cost in Ui. However, is fortune also makes j less well
o¤, so that is privateutility is again amplied. Still, if agents are identical, the latter
e¤ect is second-order, and agents are worse o¤ with bad co-worker relations. At the end
of section 4, I will discuss comparative statics with respect to .
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messages in equilibrium,mij 2 f0; 1g.4 Agents choose the evaluation message
that maximizes their utility. A low evaluation brings a cost of lying in case
the received signal was high. Similarly, giving a high evaluation brings a cost
of lying when the signal was low, and it leads to a bonus for the colleague.
The agents evaluation remains truthful (mij = sij), as long as:
Ui(ei; 0)  Ui(ei; 1) =    Bj
(1  2)  0; or  

Bj
;
for sij = 0, and with sij = 1:
Ui(ei; 1)  Ui(ei; 0) =  + Bj
(1  2)  0; or    

Bj
:
Obviously, without social preferences (i.e.,  = 0), the assumption of lying
costs leads to a truthful revelation of ones signal. However, once we allow
for co-worker relations, agents may have an incentive to lie. Namely, the
bonus for receiving a positive evaluation gives a benet or cost depending
on the agents social preferences. Agents in good relationships may have an
incentive to lie upon receiving a low signal about their colleagues perfor-
mance: When the utility of a bonus for a friend outweighs the lying costs,
agents give each other positive evaluations irrespective of the received sig-
nal. Likewise, colleagues in a bad relationship may want to lie in case of a
positive signal, as they begrudge the bonus to a disliked colleague. Truthful
evaluation is thereby constrained to   
B
   
B
; i.e., when agents have
weak social preferences, high costs of lying, or there is a small bonus for a
positive evaluation. Lemma 1 summarizes an agents evaluation strategy:
Lemma 1 Agent is evaluation strategy is: mij =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if  <   
Bj
sij if   
Bj
   
Bj
1 if  >

Bj
.
The evaluation process is truthful when agents have weak social preferences,
high lying costs, or small benets from a positive evaluation. This translates
4For other messages, I assume that the principal believes the agent received a low
signal, and awards no bonus.
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into a constraint on the bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation under
which peer evaluations remain truthful:
B  jj : (4)
In the preceding stage agents choose their e¤ort levels. The rst-order
condition for e¤ort is the following:
(1  2)dUi
dei
= (1 + )'ei()w   Cei() +
dUi
dE(sji = 1)
dE(sji = 1)
dei
= 0:
E¤ort provision increases with the team bonus, while it decreases with the
marginal costs of e¤ort. The team bonus for high output motivates agents to
exert e¤ort, in order to increase its likelihood. The team bonus also a¤ects
the income of a colleague. The latter e¤ect can be an additional benet or
costs of e¤ort depending on agent is social preferences. The team bonus
provides stronger incentives when agent i is altruistic towards j, while e¤ort
provision is supressed when i is spiteful towards j. The last term in the
rst-order condition captures incentives for e¤ort from peer evaluation. The
expectation that a co-worker receives a positive signal is increasing in e¤ort,
dE(sji=1)
dei
= 1, and a change in the co-workers signal a¤ects utility as follows:
dUi
dE(sji = 1)
8<:
  if mij = 0
Bi if mij = sij
 if mij = 1
: (5)
Combined, these terms give two incentive e¤ects. First, in case of truthful
peer evaluation, e¤ort is stimulated by the peer evaluation bonus. Agents
desire to increase the likelihood that their colleague receives a positive signal
and rates performance accordingly, such that the bonus is obtained. Sec-
ond, under non-truthful peer evaluation there is also an incentive for e¤ort,
despite that the signal about a co-workers performance is ignored in the
evaluation decision. Altruistic agents wish to increase the probability that
their colleague receives a positive signal, such that the expected lying costs
for this colleague are lower. Likewise, spiteful agents can increase the lying
costs of a colleague by increasing the probability of a positive signal. The
incentives from non-truthful peer evaluation are weaker than those of the
maximum bonus under truthful peer evaluation:
B =

jj > jj  as jj < 1:
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For non-truthful peer evaluation the bonus for receiving a positive evalua-
tion does not give incentives for e¤ort itself, however the bonus should be
su¢ ciently large to give rise to non-truthful peer evaluation strategies.5 It
is evident that non-truthful peer evaluations is unattractive to the princi-
pal when co-worker relations are good, as the incentives are weaker and the
higher B always needs to be paid. In case of bad co-worker relations, the
non-truthful equilibrium has potential to be more protable, as the peer
evaluation bonus is never paid out. Nonetheless, the principal often achieves
higher prots with truthful peer evaluation, for which a su¢ cient condition
is:
 >  1
2
(1 + )QH ; (6)
see the appendix for the proof. In case this condition does not hold, the
principal can exploit a bad relationship between agents by setting a high
peer evaluation bonus, which is never paid. As described before, agents have
an incentive to work, because they can increase the expected lying costs
of a disliked colleague. In the remainder of this paper I will assume that
(6) holds, since the practical relevance of this non-truthful equilibrium is to
my opinion limited. Consequently, we can focus on the optimal e¤ort choice
under truthful peer evaluation. In combination with the assumptions on '()
and C(), the rst-order condition for e¤ort implies that agent is optimal
e¤ort under truthful peer evaluation equals:
ei = (1 + )w +Bi: (7)
Summarizing the above: E¤ort can be stimulated through a team bonus
and a bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation. The e¤ectiveness of the
team bonus depends on an agents social preferences. The free-rider problem,
inherent to a team bonus, is less severe when co-worker relations are good.
The free-rider problem is exacerbated for bad co-worker relations, as agents
begrudge their colleague the fruits of their labour. Further, a bonus for
the receipt of a positive peer evaluation stimulates e¤ort provision, because
e¤ort inuences a colleagues expected evaluation message under truthful
peer evaluation.
5Note that, peer evaluation without a bonus, or Bi = 0, gives no incentive for e¤ort.
Developmental peer evaluation, or peer evaluation without compensation, is a much used
tool, but without value in the setting I study. Recently, Gupte (2009) presents a model of
developmental peer evaluation, where peer evaluation is used as an input to determine a
suitable training.
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Finally, the principal sets the prot maximizing contracts subject to the
incentive compatibility constraints (7), the limited-liability constraints (2),
and the constraint for truthful peer evaluation (4). Naturally, the principal
does not need to abide to this last constraint (4). The inclusion of this
constraint helps to characterize the optimal contract, but is innocuous, as
the principal cannot do better with non-truthful peer evaluation when (6)
holds. Together, this gives the principals optimization problem:
max
wLi;w;Bi;Bj
 = '() [QH   2w]  wLi   wLj   E(mij)Bj   E(mji)Bi;
s.t. wLi  0; wLi +Bi  0; wLi +w  0; wLi +Bi +w  0; Bi  jj ;
where the last limited-liability constraint is satied by a combination of the
former constraints. The rst limited-liability constraint will bind, as there is
no incentive for e¤ort from the base wage. Hence, we get wLi = 0, and the
optimization problem is reduced to:
max
w;Bi;Bj
 = '() [QH   2w]  wLi   wLj   E(mij)Bj   E(mji)Bi; (8)
s.t. w  0; Bi  0; Bi  jj ;
leading to the second-best contract described in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 The optimal contract under limited liability is characterized
by:
Bi = Bj =
1
2
QH and w = 0; if   1
2
jjQH ; (A)
Bi = Bj =

jj and w = 0; if
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
   1
2
jjQH ; (B)
Bi = Bj =

jj and w =
QH
4
  (3 + )
4(1 + ) jaj ; if  <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
:(C)
The proof can be found in the appendix. The optimal contract always
includes a bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation. The principal can
ensure peer evaluation remains truthful, by satisfying constraint (4). This
allows the principal to o¤er individual incentives for e¤ort through Bi, even
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though he does not observe the individual contributions himself. Hence,
unlike the team bonus, the peer evaluation bonus does not su¤er from an
internalization problem, which makes it a more cost-e¤ective way to stimulate
e¤ort.
Part (A) of Proposition 1 shows the optimal contract under ideal cir-
cumstances for peer evaluation, i.e. su¢ ciently high cost of lying or weak
social preferences. In this situation, the peer evaluation bonus performs as
well as providing the agents with individual incentives under limited liability.
Smaller lying costs or more pronounced social preferences constrain the peer
evaluation bonus at some point, described by contract (B). Eventually, the
principal will nd it optimal to complement incentives for e¤ort with a team
bonus, as indicated by contract (C) in Proposition 1.
The comparative statics of  and  with respect to the peer evaluation
bonus and the team bonus are described by Corollary 1:
Corollary 1 In contracts (B) and (C), the bonus for the receipt of a positive
peer evaluation is increasing in lying costs and social preferences that become
less pronounced:
@B
@
=
1
jj > 0;
@B
@
=   jj3 :
In contract (C), the team bonus is decreasing with the costs of lying, and
social preferences have an ambiguous e¤ect on the team bonus:
@w
@
=  @B
@
(3 + )
4(1 + )
< 0;
@w
@
=  @B
@
(3 + )
4(1 + )
+
1
2(1 + )2

jj : (9)
Otherwise, lying costs and social preferences do not a¤ect compensation in
the second-best contract.
Corollary 1 shows a negative relation between lying costs and the team
bonus. A decrease in the costs of lying paralyzes peer evaluation through the
constraint to keep evaluations truthful, which can make it optimal (if lying
11
Figure 1: Team bonus in the optimal contract for di¤erent (; ) combina-
tions, with QH = 13 .
costs are su¢ ciently low) to enhance e¤ort provision with a higher team
bonus. Social preferences have a twofold inuence on the strength of the
team bonus, as can be seen from (9). First, like with lying costs, stronger
social preferences constrain the bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation.
Stronger social preferences, whether negative or positive, thereby add to the
importance of the team bonus. Second, social preferences also inuence the
incentive e¤ects of a team bonus, as we already observed in (7). For altruistic
agents better co-worker relations strengthen the team bonus by both e¤ects.
The two e¤ects are in conict for bad co-worker relations that become worse,
which leads to a decrease of the team bonus at some point for more spiteful
agents. The optimal team bonus in the second-best contract is depicted in
Figure 1 for di¤erent (; ) combinations, with QH = 13 . Figure 2 and Figure
3 do so for the expected prots and expected utility.6 The comparative statics
for the expected prots and expected utility can be found in the appendix.
6The gures are qualitatively the same for other levels of QH . The su¢ cient condition
for optimality of truthful peer evaluation (6) does not hold for some (; ) combinations
in the upper left corners in Figure 1 to 3, in which case the optimal contract may look
di¤erent.
12
Figure 2: Expected prots under the optimal contract for di¤erent (; )
combinations, with QH = 13 .
Figure 3: Expected utility in the optimal contract for di¤erent (; ) combi-
nations, with QH = 13 .
13
As long as peer evaluation is unrestricted (A), the expected prots are
constant. In contract (B), lower lying costs and more pronounced co-worker
relations hurt prots, through the smaller incentive e¤ect of the peer eval-
uations. Finally, in contract (C), the size of the peer evaluation bonus and
the team bonus are both inuenced by  and . A decrease of the lying
costs leads to a shift in the compensation towards the team bonus. This
shift hurts prots, as the peer evaluation bonus stimulates e¤ort in a more
cost-e¤ective way than the team bonus does, so prots are still increasing in
 under contract (C). There is a similar e¤ect of more pronounced co-worker
relations, a shift away from the peer evaluation bonus has a negative e¤ect
on prots. In addition, better co-worker relations soften the free-rider prob-
lem, which has a favorable e¤ect on prots. Prots are increasing in  with
bad co-worker relations, as both e¤ects are in the same direction. For good
co-worker relations, prots are decreasing in  at rst, as the shift away from
peer evaluation dominates the e¤ect of a softened free-rider problem. How-
ever, the prots pick up again from some point, as the e¤ect on the free-rider
problem becomes more prominent for a larger team bonus. Summarizing,
under truthful peer evaluation, bad co-worker relations are never good for
prots, while good co-worker relations can be bad.
Agents are left with rents due to the limited liability assumption. Lying
costs only a¤ect utility through the o¤ered contract, since there is no lying
in equilibrium. Therefore, utility is constant in  for unrestricted peer evalu-
ation (A). Co-worker relations, on the other hand, have a direct and positive
e¤ect on utility, as already noted in footnote 3. In contract (B), an increase
in the lying costs relaxes the constraint on the peer evaluation bonus, and
thereby leads to a higher utility. Similarly, besides the direct e¤ect on utiltiy,
co-worker relations a¤ect the size of the peer evaluation bonus. The expected
utility is increasing in , except for moderately positive co-worker relations
(0 <  < 2
3
), where the decrease in the peer evaluation bonus outweighs the
direct e¤ect of having better co-worker relations. Finally, in contract (C),
higher lying costs cause a shift in the optimal compensation towards peer
evaluation, as noticed before. This shift away from the team bonus hurts the
agentsutility, as the team bonus comes with higher rents. A change in 
also has this e¤ect, in addition to the direct e¤ect on utility and the e¤ect
on the free-rider problem. The latter two e¤ects make the utility increasing
in co-worker relations, whereas the rst e¤ect is negative for  < 0 and can
dominate for moderately negative co-worker relations.
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5 Concluding remarks
Peer evaluation has intuitive appeal in work environments where co-workers
are in the best position to monitor each other. I have studied the possi-
bility to include peer evaluation in performance pay using a model of team
production by two limitedly liable agents. The principal only observes the
team output, while agents receive a signal about a colleagues e¤ort, allow-
ing for peer evaluation in addition to a team bonus. The combination of a
cost of lying about the received signal and interpersonal relations between
co-workers determine the agents evaluation decision. Lying costs lead to a
truthful revelation of signals, while the internalization of a bonus to a col-
league may cause a bias. Nevertheless, the optimal contract always includes
a bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation, which may be complemented
with a team bonus. Truthful peer evaluation has incentive e¤ects, as agents
desire to increase the likelihood that their colleague receives a positive signal.
Social preferences constrain the bonus for a positive evaluation so as to keep
revelation of signals truthful, leading to the testable implication, that incen-
tive e¤ects of peer evaluation diminish with more pronounced social relations
between co-workers. A managerial implication of this result is that managers
should assign employees that are rather indi¤erent towards one another to
evaluate each others performance.
There is a large debate in the management literature and organizational
psychology whether peer evaluations should only be used for developmental
purposes, or whether they can also be used to determine merit pay and pro-
motions (see among others Edwards and Ewen 1996, Coates 1998, Fleenor
and Brutus 2001). I contribute to this debate by showing that some con-
cerns of intergrating peer evaluation with performance pay can be overcome.
Namely, by setting a smaller bonus for peer evaluation, it is possible to avoid
a (dis)likeability bias. In addition, I illustrated that even invalid peer evalua-
tions can have incentive e¤ects. The distinction between developmental peer
evaluation and its integration with rewards, however, may be less strict in
practice: In case a manager is supposed to serve as a coach, it is unlikely that
the information resulting from peer evaluations is neglected in determining
promotions and pay (Edwards and Ewen 1996). The consequences of in-
cluding peer evaluation in performance pay, therefore, deserve more research
attention.
There are a number of other factors that may lead to intentional distor-
tions in peer evaluation. Peer evaluation between colleagues in promotion
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tournaments will most likely lead to a downward bias in the evaluation re-
ports, in order to boost ones own chances of winning. Carpenter et al.
(2010) provide evidence for this subtle way of sabotaging competitors in a
real e¤ort experiment, where the anticipation of sabotage eliminates the in-
centives to work in this tournament. A special case of peer evaluation is where
incumbents determine their future co-workers, or competitors for future pro-
motions, as incumbents may be most capable in evaluating the quality of
applicants. Carmichael (1988) showed that in such a setting incumbents dis-
criminate against the best possible candidates, unless the incumbentsfuture
income is ensured, which is sometimes only possible by o¤ering tenure. An-
other concern is that colleagues may try to collude with their evaluations
against the principal in repeated interactions.
The result that a principal always wants to make use of peer evaluations
is at odds with its occurance in practice. However, the prerequisite that co-
workers have valuable information on employee performance does not apply
to all organizations. Further, it is conceivable that peer evaluation has an
inuence on interpersonal relationships. Dur and Sol (2010) found that,
under the assumption of conditionally altruistic or reciprocal preferences,
externalities in wages may motivate people to invest in their relationships
with colleagues. In line with this, peer evaluation may be a good reason to
invest in the relationship with a colleague that evaluates ones performance,
so as to increase the likelihood of a positive evaluation by this colleague. By
this logic the e¤ectiveness of peer evaluation may deteriorate eventually. In
combination with some of the additional concerns named above, this o¤ers an
explanation for the gap between the theoretical prediction and the prevalence
of peer evaluations in practice.
16
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The agentse¤ort choices (7) are substituted into '() and E(mij) = p(),
which gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the principals optimiza-
tion problem (8):
d
dw
= 2(1 + )QH   8(1 + )w   (3 + )Bi   (3 + )Bj + 1  0;
w  0; w d
dw
= 0; 1  0; 1w = 0;
d
dBi
= QH   (3 + )w   2Bi + 2   3  0; Bi  0; Bi d
dBi
= 0;
2  0; 2Bi = 0; Bi   jj  0; 3  0; 3

Bi   jj

= 0;
d
dBj
= QH   (3 + )w   2Bj + 4   5  0; Bj  0; Bj d
dBj
= 0;
4  0; 4Bi = 0; Bj   jj  0; 5  0; 5

Bj   jj

= 0:
We look for a solution where Bi = Bj, as agents are homogeneous. Further,
as the constraints on Bi = Bj can never bind at the same time, the cases that
need be checked are reduced to six. (i) none of the constraints is binding, (ii)
w = 0, and Bi = Bj = 0, (iii) w > 0 and Bi = Bj = 0, (iv) w = 0 and
constraints on Bi = Bj are non-binding, (v) w > 0 and Bi = Bj =

jj ,
and (vi) w = 0 and Bi = Bj =

jj .
The rst three cases cannot be part of the optimal contract: (i) i = 0,
for which the rst-order conditions solve for w = QH
1  ; and Bi = Bj =
  (1+)QH
1  < 0, which contradicts Bi  0. (ii)w = Bi = Bj = 0, contradicts
1  0 and ddw  0 being valid at the same time. (iii) ddw = 0; 1 = 0; and
Bi = Bj = 0 give w = 14QH , but also gives:
d
dBi
= d
dBj
= 1
4
(1 )QH+2;4,
which contradicts d
dBi
= d
dBj
 0, as  1 <  < 1. The next three cases
jointly characterize the optimal contract: (iv) d
dBi
= d
dBj
= 0 and 2 =
3 = 4 = 5 = 0 give Bj = 12QH , all conditions are satised as long
as

jj 
1
2
QH  0, otherwise Bi will hit either constraint, which leads to
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contradiction. This case leads to the rst line in Proposition 1. (v) d
dw
= 0;
and 1 = 0 gives w = 14QH  
(3 + )
4(1 + ) jaj , all conditions are satised as
long as  <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
otherwise w  0 which gives a contradiction.
This case gives the third line in Proposition 1. (vi) d
dw
 0; and 1  0 give
  (1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
, otherwise the two cannot be satised simultaneously,
and d
dBi
= d
dBj
= 0 together with 2 = 4 = 0, and 3 = 5  0 give that

jj 
1
2
QH otherwise a contradiction follows. This gives the second line in
Proposition 1 and completes the characterization of the optimal contract.
To complete the proof of the optimal contract we need to compare the
prots under truthful peer evaluation with the prots of peer evaluation that
is not truthful. For non-truthful peer evaluation under good co-worker re-
lations (mij = 1), the principal always has to pay a higher peer evaluation
bonus, while incentives are weaker. Therefore, it is evident that this de-
creases the principals prots. The non-truthful evaluation strategy for bad
co-worker relations (mij = 0) seems more promising, as the principal never
has to pay the peer evaluation bonus. The size of the peer evaluation bonus
therefore does not matter for prots, it should only be su¢ ciently high so as
to give rise to the non-truthful peer evaluation strategy. The principal still
needs to nd the optimal team bonus. For mij = 0 the agents optimal e¤ort
is:
ei = (1 + )w   ;
leading to:
d
dw
= (1 + ) [QH   4w] + 2 = 0;
an optimal team bonus under mij = 0:
w = 1
4
QH +

2(1 + )
if  >  1
2
QH(1 + );
w = 0 if  <  1
2
QH(1 + );
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and giving prots:
 = 1
4
(1 + )Q2H   QH +
22
(1 + )
if  >  1
2
QH(1 + );
 =  2QH if  <  1
2
QH(1 + ).
The prots under the weakest form of truthful peer evaluation ( <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
)
are described by:
 = 1
4
(1 + )Q2H +
(1  )
2 jaj QH +
(1  )22
4(1 + ) jaj2 ;
which are strictly higher than the prots undermij = 0 with  >  12QH(1+
):
(mij = sij)  (mij = 0) = (1  )
2 jaj QH +
(1  )22
4(1 + ) jaj2 + QH  
22
(1 + )
> 0
)

1
2
(1  ) jj + 

QH +
1
(1 + )
"
1
2
(1  ) jj
2
  ()2
#
> 0
) 1
2
(1  ) jj >   )  [1  + 2 jj] > 0) 1  + 2 jj > 0
)  >  1;
which is satised by assumption. In case  <  1
2
QH(1 + ), the prots for
non-truthful peer evaluation can be higher than those under truthful peer
evaluation. The principal does not have to pay any wages in this case. He
exploits the bad relationship between the agents by awarding a high peer
evaluation bonus, which he never has to pay. Agents exert e¤ort to increase
their disliked colleagues lying costs. For extreme lying costs, the principal
can obtain high output with certainty for free.
Comparative statics for expected prots and expected utility
The expected prots under truthful peer evaluation can be written as:
E() = 2 [(1 + )w +B] [QH   2w  B] : (B1)
By substituting the optimal contract into (B1) gives:
E() =
1
2
Q2H ;
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for contract (A), leading to the comparative static e¤ects :
@E()
@
=
@E()
@
= 0:
Similar, for contract (B) we obtain:
E() = 2

jj

QH   jj

;
and:
@E()
@
=
2
jj

QH   2 jj

> 0;
@E()
@
=  2jj3

QH   2 jj

;
as comparative static results. Expected prots are increasing in  for contract
(B), as jj <
1
2
QH . Likewise, expected prots are increasing in  for  < 0,
and decreasing in  for  > 0, i.e., expected prots decrease with more
pronounced co-worker relation. The expected prots under contract (C) are:
E() = 2

(1 + )QH
4
+
(1  )
4 jaj
 
QH
2
+
(1  )
2(1 + ) jaj

;
which gives comparative static results:
@E()
@
=
(1  )QH
2 jaj +
(1  )2
2(1 + ) jaj2 > 0;
@E()
@
=   jj3

(1  )QH
2
+
(1  )2
2(1 + ) jj

+ 2w [QH   2w  B] :
Expected prots are increasing in , as lying costs shift compensation towards
a higher peer evaluation bonus, which is a more cost-e¤ective manner of
stimulating e¤ort. Co-worker relations have two e¤ects on prots: First,
as before, co-worker relations a¤ect expected prots through a change in
the peer evaluation bonus. Second, better co-worker relations increase the
e¤ectiveness of the team bonus. Expected prots are increasing in , except
for moderately positive co-worker relations, as the e¤ect through the peer
evaluation bonus dominates the favorable e¤ect on the free-rider problem for
a small team bonus.
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The comparative static e¤ects with respect to expected utility are best
shown when we rewrite (3) slightly. A substitution of Uj into is utility
function, in combination with the homogeneity assumption, gives:
E(U) =
1
1   ['()w + p()B   C()]
=
1
1  

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

:
The expected utility under contract (A) is:
E(U) =
1
1  
Q2H
8
;
which yields the following comparative statics:
@E(U)
@
= 0;
@E(U)
@
=
1
(1  )2
Q2H
8
> 0:
Contract (B) gives expected utility:
E(U) =
1
1  
1
2
2
jj2 ;
and comparative statics:
@E(U)
@
=

(1  ) jj2 > 0;
@E(U)
@
=
2
(1  ) jj2

1
2(1  )  

jj2

:
In contract (B), the expected utility is increasing in , except for 0 <  < 2
3
.
Finally, the expected utility in contract (C) equals:
E(U) =
1
1  

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

=
1
32(1  )

(3  )QH   (5 + )(1  )
(1 + ) jj
 
(1 + )QH +
(1  )
jj

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and comparative static analysis gives:
@E(U)
@
=   1
1  
@B
@

(1  )B
2(1 + )
+
(1  2)w
4

< 0
@E(U)
@
=   1
1  
@B
@

(1  )B
2(1 + )
+
(1  2)w
4

+
B [(3  )(1 + )w + 2B]
2(1  )2
+
1
(1  )2

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

Expected utility is decreasing in the lying costs. Although higher lying costs
allow for a higher peer evaluation bonus, which increases rents as we saw in
contract (B), the team bonus decreases simultaneously, which has a stronger
e¤ect on workers rents. There is a similar e¤ect on utility for co-worker
relations. As these become more pronounced, compensation shifts towards a
higher team bonus, denoted by the rst term. This term is negative for  < 0
and positive for  > 0. Further, utility increases in the co-worker relations
through a softened free-rider problem and the direct e¤ect on utility, captured
by the second and third term respectively. In sum, utility is increasing in
, excepts for some moderately negative co-worker relations, where the rst
term dominates.
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